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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
JEFF Q. TUCKER, : 
Plaintiff-Respondent, : Case No. 880350-CA 
vs. : 
DEON N. DOVE, dba : 
DOVE'S HAPPY SERVICE, 
a corporation, BENITO M. VAN, : 
and JOHN DOES 1 through 10, Category 14b 
Defendants-Appellants. 
APPELLANTS' BRIEF 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW 
This is an appeal from a judgment entered after a non-jury 
trial. The Utah Supreme Court had jurisdiction over this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3) (i) (1987), and trans-
ferred the case to this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-
2(4). This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(h). 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Were the findings of the District Court internally 
inconsistent, where the court found that defendant Benito Van 
had probable cause to suspect plaintiff of shoplifting and 
therefore to detain him, yet found that Mr. Van did not have 
probable cause to sign a criminal citation alleging that 
plaintiff had shoplifted? 
2. Was the plaintiff entitled to an award of pre-judgment 
interest on the general damage award for humiliation? 
RELEVANT STATUTES 
The provisions of Utah Code Ann. §§ 76-6-404 (1978), 76-6-
602 (Supp. 1988), 76-6-603 (Supp. 1988), 76-6-604 (Supp. 1988), 
and 77-7-14 (1982, amended by 1987 Utah Laws ch. 245, § 10), 
regarding retail theft and detention and arrest of suspected 
violators, are set forth in Appendix MA". 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, 
This is a tort action for damages alleged to have been 
suffered by plaintiff when he was detained and accused of shop-
lifting by defendants and subsequently arrested based on 
defendantsf complaint. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below, 
This action was filed on May 23, 1986 (R. 1), and was tried 
before The Honorable Dennis L. Draney, sitting without a jury, 
on September 15, 1987. (R. 144, 168). The trial court issued a 
Ruling (R. 101-02) on September 22, 1987, determining the issues 
substantially in favor of plaintiff, and formal Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law (R. 138-43) and a Judgment (R. 144-45) 
were entered on February 1, 1988. 
An Order for Extension of Time to Appeal was entered by the 
court on March 7, 1988. (R. 154.) Defendants1 Notice of Appeal 
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was filed on March 28, 1988 (R. 156) and plaintiff's Notice of 
Cross-Appeal was filed on April 15, 1988.x (R. 165.) 
C. Statement of Facts. 
On November 19, 1985, plaintiff and three of his friends 
entered Dove's Happy Service, a retail grocery store in 
Roosevelt, Utah, which is owned and operated by Deon N. Dove. 
(R. 227, 229, 372.) Conflicting evidence was offered concerning 
what happened in the store. A security guard employed by Mr. 
Dove, Benito M. Van, testified that he was on a "catwalk" above 
the store floor at the time the boys entered the store. He 
observed plaintiff open a package for a television cable 
splitter, and then remove and conceal the splitter in his 
pocket. (R. 391.) Mr. Van left the catwalk to go to the store 
floor to apprehend plaintiff, and was unable to view plaintiff's 
actions for a period of time. (R. 391-92.) Upon reaching the 
store floor, he was stopped by and talked for several minutes 
with an acquaintance, James Wymer, who was one of the friends 
who had come in with plaintiff. (R. 292-96; 392.) The boys 
congregated at a magazine rack and prepared to leave. (R. 392.) 
Mr. Van apprehended plaintiff and one of his companions, Toby 
Clark, just before the boys left the store. (R. 393.) 
Plaintiff and his friends testified that they had entered 
Appellant has filed herewith a Motion to Dismiss asserting 
that the cross-appeal was untimely. R. Utah S. Ct. 4(d). 
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the store for the purpose of purchasing some speaker wire.2 
They proceeded to the aisle containing electrical parts, but en 
route James Wymer met and stopped to talk with Mr. Van. (R. 2 32, 
295-96.) The remaining three boys went down the aisle contain-
ing electrical parts and began to look for speaker wire. The 
boys1 testimony was inconsistent as to whether they could see 
Mr. Van, or Mr. Van see them, while they were down the aisle. 
(E.g., R. 255, 259, 301, 306.) The boys all agreed that the TV 
splitter package was already open, and that plaintiff removed 
the splitter, inspected it for a while, left the now empty 
package on the shelf, and discarded the splitter on another 
shelf at the end of the aisle. (R. 233-35,325-26, 352-53, 360.) 
All parties agreed that Mr. Van approached the boys at the 
front of the store, and plaintiff and one of his friends, who 
had been in close proximity to plaintiff when the events 
surrounding the cable splitter occurred, willingly complied with 
Mr. Van's request that they accompany him to a room at the rear 
of the store. (R. 238, 263-65.) Mr. Van and a store manager 
told the two boys they were suspected of shoplifting, and the 
boys denied the accusations and offered to allow themselves to 
be searched. (R. 240.) Mr. Van and the manager stated that 
they would summon the police to perform a search. (Id.) The 
2The complaint alleged that they had entered the store for 
the purpose of inspecting a "switch" which he wanted, and that 
plaintiff did inspect a "switch" box which he discovered to be 
empty. (R. 2.) The complaint was amended at trial to alleged 
that one of plaintiff's friends was seeking speaker wire. 
(R. 378, 489.) 
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police were summoned and searched plaintiff and his friend, but 
failed to locate the cable splitter. (R. 241.) Mr. Van 
identified plaintiff as the individual who had pocketed the 
item, and the friend was allowed to leave. (R. 241.) Mr. Van 
signed a citation issued by the police which charged plaintiff 
with shoplifting (R. 368-70) and plaintiff was placed under 
arrest. (R. 241-42, 364-65.) Plaintiff was escorted by two 
police officers outside the store, handcuffed, taken to the 
police station, booked, and jailed. (R. 241-45.) He was 
released from jailed upon his mother posting bail of $106.00. 
(R. 245.) 
Plaintiff acknowledged that Mr. Van's and the store 
manager's treatment of him was civil and courteous at all times. 
(R. 263-65; see also R. 395-96.) 
After plaintiff had been arrested and had left the store, 
Mr. Van discovered the cable splitter concealed behind packages 
of potato chips at the end of the aisle, and delivered the 
splitter to the police (R. 394.) 
The criminal charges against plaintiff were dismissed upon 
plaintiff's motion. (R. 56, 176-77, 249.) Plaintiff testified 
that he paid $750.00 to his attorney for representation in the 
criminal matter. (R. 249.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
By finding that defendants had probable cause to detain and 
cause the search of the plaintiff, the trial court implicitly 
accepted the testimony of defendant Benito Van over that of the 
plaintiff. The accounts of the parties are polarized. The 
trial court believed the testimony of Mr. Van, who described 
plaintiff's removal of the splitter from its package and his 
placing it in his pocket. The detention and subsequent arrest 
of the plaintiff are inseparably connected acts, and separate 
standards for probable cause do not apply. Rather, when 
probable cause exists to believe that the crime of retail theft 
has occurred, such probable cause extends both to detention and 
to arrest. 
Even if detention and arrest are considered separately, 
probable cause existed for plaintiff's arrest as a matter of 
law. The mere taking or concealing of store property, such as 
witnessed by Mr. Van, is sufficient to constitute the crime of 
retail theft. It is irrelevant whether the store property was 
found on plaintiff's person or in its secreted location prior to 
the arrest. The trial court erred in holding that probable 
cause existed for the detention but did not also exist for the 
arrest. 
If the decision of the trial court is affirmed as to civil 
liability, then the award of prejudgment interest must be 
reversed. A general damages award for humiliation or false 
arrest is not one which can be calculated with mathematical 
accuracy and prejudgment interest is not allowable for such an 
award. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT'S RULING IS 
INTERNALLY INCONSISTENT. 
The trial court ruled that defendants "were without 
probable cause to take any action beyond the initial detention 
and search" (R. 102, 142), and thereby implicitly held that 
defendants had sufficient cause for the initial detention and 
search. These rulings are inconsistent as a matter of law. It 
appears from the record that the bases for the trial court's 
ruling were the trial court's erroneous determination of two 
issues. First, the trial court apparently concluded that only 
reasonable cause was required for the initial detention and 
search, whereas probable cause was required for the arrest. 
(R. 216-24, 476.) Second, the trial court concluded that 
finding the allegedly stolen item on the plaintiff's person was 
a prerequisite to the existence of probable cause. (R. 102.) 
A. Detention and Arrest are Inseparably Connected and 
Probable Cause for One is Necessarily Probable Cause for the 
Other. 
Where, as in the present case, a dispute exists as to the 
principal facts in a shoplifting case, the determination of 
reasonableness and probable cause, which are requisite for the 
statutory protection against false arrest charges, is primarily 
a question of fact to be resolved by the finder of fact. Terry 
v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314, 320-21 (1979), 
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modified, 617 P.2d 700 (Utah 1980). Accord Draeger v. Grand 
Cent., Inc., 504 F.2d 142, 144 (10th Cir. 1974). 
By finding that Benito Van had probable cause to detain and 
cause the search of the plaintiff, the trial court implicitly 
accepted the testimony of Benito Van as to the events which 
occurred in the store.3 Jordon v. Mangel Stores, 336 S.2d 278, 
279 (La. App. 1976) (where trial court found that defendants 
were reasonably justified in detaining and arresting plaintiff, 
it therefore must have been unable to accept plaintiff's 
testimony of the events surrounding the alleged shoplifting). 
Probable cause to detain and cause a search of the plaintiff 
necessarily is probable cause for the arrest of the plaintiff. 
The trial court implicitly found there was probable cause to 
believe plaintiff had committed retail theft. With this 
probable cause, defendants were authorized by Utah law to detain 
the plaintiff in a reasonable manner and surrender him to the 
police, which is precisely what they did. (R. 238-42.) 
Any merchant who has probable cause to 
believe that a person has committed retail 
theft may detain such person, on or off the 
premises of a retail mercantile establish-
ment, in a reasonable manner and for a 
reasonable length of time for all or any of 
the following purposes: 
3No other conclusion could reasonably be made from the 
evidence presented. Although plaintiff and his friends tes-
tified that Benito Van was unable to see them at the time the 
concealment of store property allegedly took place (R. 262, 305-
06, 338), the testimony is inherently unbelievable. It would be 
unreasonable to believe that Mr. Van would have stopped the boys 
and accused plaintiff of shoplifting if he had not been watching 
the boys and if had he not seen plaintiff remove the splitter 
from its package. 
8 
(5) To inform a peace officer of the 
detention of the person and surrender that 
person to the custody of a peace officer[.] 
Utah Code Ann, § 76-6-603 (Supp. 1988). 
Nowhere in the Utah statutes or case law are separate 
standards applied for arrest and detention in shoplifting. The 
standard of "reasonable and probable cause to believe the person 
committed a theft of goods" is applied to both detention and 
arrest: 
A peace officer, merchant, or merchant's 
employee, servant, or agent who causes the 
detention of a person as provided in § 77-7-
12, or who causes the arrest of a person for 
theft of goods held or displayed for sale 
shall not be criminally or civilly liable 
where he has reasonable and probable grounds 
to believe the person detained or arrested 
committed a theft of goods held or displayed 
for sale. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-14 (1982, amended by 1987 Utah Laws ch. 
245, § 10)4(emphasis added). A merchant may use probable cause 
as a defense not only against actions arising out of the 
detention of a suspected shoplifter (such as unlawful detention 
or false imprisonment), but also against actions arising out of 
the arrest of the suspected shoplifter as well (such as false 
arrest). 
In any action for false arrest, false 
imprisonment, unlawful detention, defamation 
4The 1987 amendment changed the phrase "reasonable and 
probable grounds" to "reasonable and probable cause" and made 
some stylistic changes. Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-14(1) (Supp. 
1988) . 
Q 
of character, assault, trespass, or invasion 
of civil rights brought by any person 
detained by the merchant, it shall be a 
defense to such action that the merchant 
detaining such person had probable cause to 
believe that the person had committed retail 
theft and that the merchant acted reasonably 
under all circumstances. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-604 (Supp. 1988)(emphasis added). 
The trial court found that Benito Van had probable cause to 
detain the plaintiff. Mr. Van watched the plaintiff remove an 
item from a store display and conceal that item in his pocket. 
(R. 391.) This act gave rise to a reasonable and probable cause 
for Benito Van to believe that plaintiff had committed a theft 
of goods displayed for sale. Section 77-7-14 provides that when 
such a reasonable and probable cause exists, and the suspected 
person is detained and arrested, there is no civil liability on 
the part of the merchant. The standard of reasonable and 
probable cause is not bifurcated, rather it is the same for 
arrest as for detention. 
B. Even if Detention and Arrest are Considered 
Separately, Probable Cause for Arrest Existed as a Matter of 
Law. 
The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly held: 
that an item need not be taken from a re-
tailer^ premises to constitute the crime of 
theft, but that a defendant's acts of 
exercising unauthorized control over an item 
within a retail establishment was suffi-
cient. 
State v. Watts, 639 P.2d 158, 162 (Utah 1981). Accord State v. 
Eagle, 611 P.2d 1211 (Utah 1980); State v. Bender, 581 P.2d 1019 
(Utah 1978). 
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When Benito Van witnessed the plaintiff remove an item from 
the store shelf and secret it in his pocket, Mr. Van then had 
reasonable and probable cause to believe that a crime had been 
committed.5 It is irrelevant that the item was not found on the 
plaintiff's person when he was detained and searched or that the 
item was not found in its place of concealment in the store 
until after the citation was signed. It is not necessary for an 
individual to be successful in his attempt at shoplifting in 
order to have committed a crime. 
The fact that defendant was unable to escape 
undetected is of no consequence, for escape 
is not a necessary element of the crime of 
theft. Nor is he to be absolved of guilt by 
his abandonment of the loot anymore than 
would a bank robber, burglar, or other law-
breaker, who throws away, or otherwise 
abandons, the fruits of his crime. 
State v. Eagle, 611 P.2d 1211, 1213 (Utah 1980). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602 (Supp. 1988) provides that: 
A person commits the offense of retail theft 
when he knowingly: 
(1) takes possession of, conceals, carries 
away, transfers or causes to be carried away 
or transferred, any merchandise displayed, 
held, stored or offered for sale in a retail 
mercantile establishment with the intention 
of retaining such merchandise or with the 
intention of depriving the merchant perma-
nently of the possession, use or benefit of 
5The analysis set forth in this Point applies even if the 
plaintiff's witnesses are believed. The plaintiff admitted to 
removing the splitter from its package and carrying it away some 
distance from where it had been located. Although a prosecutor 
in his or her discretion may choose not to prosecute such a 
case, probable cause to believe a crime was committed nonethe-
less existed at the point that plaintiff proceeded to walk away 
with the splitter. 
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such merchandise without paying the retail 
value of such merchandise; 
(Emphasis added.) 
This section, while enacted specifically to cover shop-
lifting, does not supercede § 76-6-404 (1978) which, prior to 
the enactment of § 76-6-602, covered shoplifting. It provides 
that a "person commits theft if he obtains or exercises unautho-
rized control over the property of another with a purpose to 
deprive him thereof." In applying this statute, the Utah 
Supreme Court held in State v. Walker. 649 P. 2d 16, 17 (Utah 
1982), that a person could be found guilty "without ever finding 
that he 'obtained' the property, so long as he exercised 
unauthorized control thereof." In the present case, the trial 
court concluded that "having found no property of the store on 
plaintiff's person or where it could have been placed by 
plaintiff, until after the citation was signed and the arrest 
made, defendants were without probable cause to take any action 
beyond the initial detention and search." (R. 102.) This 
conclusion is erroneous since Mr. Van had probable cause to 
believe that the plaintiff had committed retail theft. It was 
not necessary to find the store's property on the plaintiff, or 
in its secreted location, in order to establish the probable 
cause. Benito Van witnessed the act of retail theft, and 
therefore had probable cause to sign the arrest citation. 
Clearly, the most significant aspect of 
these [modern shoplifting] statutes, from 
the merchant's standpoint, is that the 
propriety, if not the legality, of the 
arrest, is no longer dependent upon a 
12 
finding, either in the false imprisonment 
action or in a criminal proceeding for 
shoplifting, that the suspect was actually 
guilty of the offense. 
Annot., Construction and Effect, In False Imprisonment Action, 
of Statute Providing for Detention of Suspected Shoplifters, 47 
A.L.R. 3d 998, 1005 (1973) (emphasis added). 
In Jordon v. Mangel Stores, 336 S.2d 278 (La. App. 1976), a 
factually similar case applying Louisiana's shoplifting stat-
utes, which are similar to the Utah statutes, a store security 
guard saw the plaintiff break open a socket wrench set and 
remove one of the sockets. The plaintiff apparently saw the 
guard watching him, because he concealed the socket and began to 
walk toward the front of the store. The security guard pursued 
the plaintiff, but was unable to catch up until the plaintiff 
was almost out of the store. The guard stopped the plaintiff at 
the door and took him to the store office, where he was 
searched. The socket was not found on plaintiff's person. The 
plaintiff denied the shoplifting accusation, even denying that 
he went into the hardware department of the store. Plaintiff 
was then formally arrested and was later tried on the charges 
and acquitted. Jordon at 279. 
The Jordon court held that it was clear from the record 
that if the store guard's testimony in the civil case was 
accepted, the defendants had probable and reasonable cause for 
both the detention and the arrest. The court reached this 
decision without stating whether or not the socket was ever 
found, which demonstrates that the court considered this 
information to be unnecessary. The court went on to note that 
if the plaintiff's testimony was accepted, there could be no 
such reasonable cause. Id. at 279-80. The court found that 
since the trial court held that defendants were reasonably 
justified in their actions, they must therefore have been unable 
to accept the plaintiff's testimony. Id. at 280. 
The facts of the present case are very similar to Jordon 
with the exception that the trial court did not find that Benito 
Van had probable cause to sign the arrest citation, although he 
did have probable cause to detain and search the plaintiff. 
This probable cause existed because Mr. Van reasonably believed 
plaintiff committed an act of retail theft. Following the 
Jordon court analysis, the defendants in the present case should 
have no civil liability for the detention and arrest of a 
suspected shoplifter when the act of shoplifting was witnessed 
by a store employee, regardless of whether the store item was 
found on the alleged shoplifter's person. 
Further reinforcing the principle that removing and 
concealing an item constitutes theft is the common law crime of 
larceny. An element of common law larceny is asportation which 
is "[t]he removal of things from one place to another." Black's 
Law Dictionary 105 (5th Ed. 1979). "Because larceny is complete 
upon the asportation, however slight, of another's property, the 
mere taking of a displayed item and concealing it, with the 
requisite intent, would be sufficient to support a conviction 
for larceny." Utah Legislative Survey - 1979, Retail Theftf 
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1980 Utah L. Rev. 193, 195 n. 253, citing, W. LaFave & A. Scott, 
Criminal Law 622, 631-32 (1972). 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602 (Supp. 1988) requires, in 
addition to concealment, that there be an intention to deprive 
the merchant permanently of the possession of the merchandise in 
order for the crime of retail theft to have been committed. 
Removing an item from the store without paying the retail value 
would be conclusive evidence of intent; however, such removal is 
not required. Under Colorado's shoplifting statutes, it has 
been held that "concealment of goods is prima facia evidence of 
the intent to commit the crime of theft." Gonzales v. Harris, 
34 Colo. App. 282, 528 P.2d 259, 262-63 (1974), rev'd on other 
grounds, 189 Colo. 518, 542 P.2d 842 (1975). Moreover, the Utah 
Supreme Court has held that: 
even if the crime was not in fact being 
committed or attempted, if the defendant, in 
good faith believes that such facts are 
present as to lead him to an honest con-
clusion that a crime is being committed by 
the person to be arrested, then he may not 
be held liable for false arrest. 
Terry, 605 P.2d at 320. 
In State v. Barber, 747 P.2d 436 (Utah App. 1987), Barber 
appealed his conviction of retail theft. The facts of the case 
reveal that a store security guard had witnessed Barber direct-
ing his son to conceal a package, which was later discovered to 
contain a video recorder. One of the issues on appeal was 
whether a theft of that recorder in fact occurred since it was 
never removed from the store, but was merely concealed on the 
premises. Id. at 437-38. In affirming Barber's conviction of 
retail theft, the Utah Court of Appeals stated: 
On the issue of his intent, Barber chooses 
to ignore that, under our statute, theft is 
committed by taking possession, concealing, 
transferring or causing to be carried away 
or transferred, any merchandise. The fact 
that the recorder was not "carried away" out 
of the store makes no difference. There is 
ample evidence to support the conclusion 
that Barber directed the taking and hiding 
of the recorder — acts sufficient to 
constitute concealment or transfer under the 
statute — with the intent to permanently 
deprive ZCMI of it. 
Id. at 440. Mr. Van watched the plaintiff remove an item from 
its package and conceal it in his pocket. This act is suffi-
cient to give rise to the honest conclusion that plaintiff 
intended to deprive the store of its property, and therefore, 
that a crime had been committed. 
The trial court correctly implicitly found that defendants 
had probable cause to suspect that plaintiff had committed the 
crime of retail theft, and that defendants could not, therefore, 
be held civilly liable for detaining and causing the search of 
the plaintiff. However, the trial court erred in finding that 
the probable cause which defendants had, did not extend to 
signing the criminal citation. 
POINT II 
AN AWARD OF PRE-JUDGMENT 
INTEREST IS IMPROPER. 
Defendants are protected from civil liability in the 
present case by the Utah Retail Theft Act. However, if this 
16 
Court affirms the civil damages award of the trial court, the 
award of prejudgment interest is improper. In the final 
judgment of the trial court in the present case, entered on 
February 1, 1988, an award of pre-judgment interest was granted. 
(R. 145.) The damages award given to plaintiff was based upon 
the "humiliation11 caused by the arrest. (R. 102, 145.) In such 
a case as this, where the amount of a loss cannot be calculated 
with mathematical accuracy, an award of prejudgment interest is 
never proper. 
Prejudgment interest may be awarded in a 
case where the loss is fixed as of a 
particular time and the amount of the loss 
can be calculated with mathematical ac-
curacy . 
Jorcrensen v. John Clay & Co. , 660 P.2d 229, 233 (Utah 1983) 
(citations omitted). 
There are numerous examples in Utah case law of situations 
in which an amount of loss can be calculated with mathematical 
accuracy and, therefore, a prejudgment interest award is 
appropriate. See, e.g. Golden Key Realty v. Mantas, 699 P. 2d 
730 (Utah 1985) (liquidated damages on accord and satisfaction 
of exclusive real estate listing agreement); Bennion v. State 
Bd. of Oil, Gas & Mining, 675 P. 2d 1135 (Utah 1983) (mineral 
royalties owed); Christenson v. Commonwealth Land Title Ins, 
Co., 666 P. 2d 3 02 (Utah 1983) (negligent acknowledgment of 
document by escrow agent). However, in cases that involve 
damages for things such as mental anguish or punitive damages, 
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the Utah Supreme Court has held that prejudgment interest is 
inappropriate. 
As to the awards for mental anguish and 
punitive damages, however, prejudgment 
interest is inappropriate . . • . [The] rule 
clearly precludes prejudgment interest on 
the court's mental anguish and punitive 
damages awards, which were not fixed or 
ascertainable before the time of trial. 
First Sec. Bank of Utah v, J.B.J. Feedyards, Inc., 653 P.2d 591, 
600 (Utah 1982). A damages award for humiliation is of the same 
character as damages for mental anguish. In each case, no 
amount of loss can be mathematically calculated. Moreover, it 
has been held that damages, in general, for actions involving 
restraint of a person, such as false imprisonment or false 
arrest, are not mathematically calculable. Therefore, they do 
not give rise to an award for prejudgment interest. 
[T]he amount of money which will compensate 
one for an unwarranted restraint of his 
person cannot realistically be the subject 
of exact computation. The question involves 
such emotions as humiliation, shame and 
public disgrace, which are not capable of 
calculable qualification. 
Town of Jackson v. Shaw, 569 P.2d 1246, 1251 (Wyo. 1977). In 
the present case, an award of prejudgment interest clearly is 
error. 
CONCLUSION 
When probable cause exists to believe that the crime of 
retail theft has occurred, such probable cause applies both to 
the detention and to the arrest of the suspect. Even if 
detention and arrest are considered separately, however, in the 
present case probable cause existed for the arrest as a matter 
of law. The trial court erred in holding that probable cause 
existed for the detention but did not also exist for the arrest. 
The decision of the trial court that probable cause existed for 
the detention and search be affirmed, but the decision that 
probable cause did not exist for actions beyond the detention 
and search should be reversed. The judgment in favor of 
plaintiff must accordingly be reversed, and the case remanded 
with instructions to enter judgment of no cause of action. 
If the decision of the trial court is affirmed as to 
liability, the award of prejudgment interest is inappropriate 
and should be reversed since the damages award is not one which 
can be calculated with mathematical accuracy. 
DATED this 1st day of September, 1988. 
F R E D D T H O W A E D a n d / ] 
LESLIE W. SLAUGH, for: U 
HOWARD, LEWIS & PETERSEN 
Attorneys for Defendants-
Appellants 
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APPENDIX "A" 
STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404 (1978). Theft—Elements. 
A person commits theft if he obtains or exercises un-
authorized control over the property of another with a purpose 
to deprive him thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-602 (Supp. 1988). Retail theft, acts 
constituting. 
A person commits the offense of retail theft when he 
knowingly: 
(1) Takes possession of, conceals, carries away, trans-
fers or causes to be carried away or transferred, any merchan-
dise displayed, held, stored or offered for sale in a retail 
mercantile establishment with the intention of retaining such 
merchandise or with the intention of depriving the merchant 
permanently of the possession, use or benefit of such merchan-
dise without paying the retail value of such merchandise; or 
(2) Alters, transfers, or removes any label, price tag, 
marking, indicia of value or any other markings which aid in 
determining value of any merchandise displayed, held, stored or 
offered for sale, in a retail mercantile establishment and 
attempts to purchase such merchandise personally or in consort 
with another at less than the retail value with the intention of 
depriving the merchant of the retail value of such merchandise; 
or 
(3)Transfers any merchandise displayed, held, stored or 
offered for sale in a retail mercantile establishment from the 
container in or on which such merchandise is displayed to any 
other container with the intention of depriving the merchant of 
the retail value of such merchandise; or 
(4) Under-rings with the intention of depriving the 
merchant of the retail value of the merchandise; or 
(5) Removes a shopping cart from the premises of a retail 
mercantile establishment with the intent of depriving the 
merchant of the possession, use or benefit of such cart. 
a-i 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-603 (Supp. 1988). Detention of suspected 
violator by merchant—Purposes. 
Any merchant who has probable cause to believe that a 
person has committed retail theft may detain such person, on or 
off the premises of a retail mercantile establishment, in a 
reasonable manner and for a reasonable length of time for all or 
any of the following purposes: 
(1) To make reasonable inquiry as to whether such person 
has in his possession ?)unpurchased merchandise and to make 
reasonable investigation of the ownership of such merchandise; 
(2) To request identification; 
(3) To verify such identification; 
(4) To make a reasonable request of such person to place 
or keep in full view any merchandise such individual may have 
removed, or which the merchant has reason to believe he may have 
removed, from its place of display or elsewhere, whether for 
examination, purchase or for any other reasonable purpose; 
(5) To inform a peace officer of the detention of the 
person and surrender that person to the custody of a peace 
officer; 
(6) In the case of a minor, to inform a peace officer, the 
parents, guardian or other private person interested in the 
welfare of that minor immediately, if possible, of this 
detention and to surrender custody of such minor to such 
person. 
A merchant may make a detention as permitted herein off the 
premises of a retail mercantile establishment only if such 
detention is pursuant to an immediate pursuit of such person. 
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Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-604 (Supp. 1988). Defense to action by 
person detained. 
In any action for false arrest, false imprisonment, 
unlawful detention, defamation of character, assault, trespass, 
or invasion of civil rights brought by any person detained by 
the merchant, it shall be a defense to such action that the 
merchant detaining such person had probable cause to believe 
that the person had committed retail theft and that the merchant 
acted reasonably under all circumstances. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-7-14 (1982, amended by 1987 Utah Laws ch. 
245, § 10) Person causing detention or arrest of person 
suspected of shoplifting — Civil and criminal immunity. 
A peace officer, merchant, or merchant's employee, 
servant, or agent who causes the detention of a person as 
provided in section 77-7-12, or who causes the arrest of a 
person for theft of goods held or displayed for sale shall not 
criminally or civilly liable where he has reasonable and 
probable grounds to believe the person detained or arrested 
committed a theft of goods held or displayed for sale. 
A-3 
APPENDIX "B" 
Ruling, September 22, 1987 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
in and for Duchesne County 
of the State of Utah 
CIVIL MINUTE ENTRY 
JEFF Q. TUCKER NO. 86-CV-94-D 
VS. DATE: SEPTEMBER 22, 1987 
DEON N. DOVE, dba DOVE HAPPY JUDGE: DENNIS L. DRANEY 
SERVICE, a corporation, BENITO 
M. VAN, and John Does 1-10 
R U L I N G 
Having fully considered the evidence and argunents of counsel, the Court 
finds that: 
(1) Defendant Benito Van was, at all times relevant hereto, an agent of 
defendant Deon Dove, and acting in the scope of that agency. 
(2) Defendant Van, with the assistance of others, detained plaintiff, and 
caused plaintiff to be searched by police officers. 
(3) No property belonging to defendant's store was found on plaintiff, and 
none was found where it could have been placed by plaintiff, until after the 
citation was issued and the arrest made. 
(4) Defendant Van signed the citation, and plaintiff was taken into 
custody by officers of the Roosevelt City Police Department and, was booked and 
released after posting bond in the sum of $106.00. 
(5) Criminal action was commenced against plaintiff by Roosevelt City, but 
was dismissed before trial upon Tucker's (plaintiff herein) Motion to 
Dismiss. 
(6) Plaintiff employed counsel to represent him in the criminal action at 
the cost of $750.00. 
(7) Plaintiff suffered humiliation at being escorted from the store, 
through the public exit in the view of his friends and others. 
'-^rKMAfiET7. Clerk O l v i x 
(8) Plaintiff's public record will show the filing of the criminal 
charges, which record may be expunged within the time provided by law. 
(9) Based upon the foregoing Findings, the court concludes that: 
(1) Having found no property of the store on plaintiff's person or 
where it could have been placed by plaintiff, until after the citation was 
signed and the arrest made. Defendants were without probable cause to 
take any action beyond the initial detention and search. 
(2) The actions of the defendants were not done maliciously, even 
though no probable cause existed for the arrest. 
(3) Plaintiff is entitled to general damages for money expended, 
and for his public humiliation. 
(4) Plaintiff is not entitled to punitive damages. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, and Conclusions of Law, it is 
hereby ordered that Plaintiff is awarded judgment as follows: 
(a) $750.00 attorneys fees for defense of the criminal 
action. 
(b) $106.00 for the bond posted if the same was not 
returned to plaintiff or his mother. 
(c) $2,500.00 for the humiliation caused by his arrest. 
Plaintiff's counsel is requested to prepare formal Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions of Law, and Judgment in accordance with this ruling, and the 
provisions of Rule 2.9, Rules of Practice. 
DATED: JJI^LJ^^ S?f9 
District Court Judge 
copy to: 
George E. Mangan 
Fred D. Howard 
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APPENDIX "C" 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law 
FT: "-r*i 
1 GEORGE E. MANGAN (2068), of 
2 GEORGE E. MANGAN, APC 
3 Attorney for Plaintiff 
4 47 North Second East 
5 Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
6 801-722-2428 
7 
8 IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE CCUNTY 
9 STATE OF UTAH 
10 
11 
12 JEFF Q. TUCKER, 
13 
14 Plaintiff, 
15 
16 vs. 
17 
18 DEON N. DOVE, dba DOVE'S 
19 HAPPY SERVICE, a corporation 
20 BENITO M. VAN and JOHN DOES 
21 1-10, 
22 Defendants. 
23 
24 
25 The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial on 
26 September 15, 1987, before the Honorable Dennis L. Draney. The 
27 plaintiff was present with his attorney, George E. Mangan. The 
28 defendants were also present with their attorney Fred D. Howard. 
29 Witnesses were called, sworn and did testify. Numerous exhibits 
30 were marked, identified and received into evidence. Both parties 
31 rested, and each argued their case to the Court and responded to 
32 inquiries of the Court. The Court took the matter under 
33 advisement. 
34 The Court having heard the evidence and entered its Ruling, 
35 does now hereby make and enter the fallowing Findings of Fact: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 86-CV-94 D 
Judge Dennis L. Draney 
1. On November 19, 1986, at approximately 6:00 PM, the 
plaintiff in the company of three of his friends, was a business 
invitee at a grocery store in Roosevelt, Utah, that belongs to 
the defendant Deon Dove-
2. At all times relevant hereto, the defendant Benito Van 
was an authorized agent of the defendant Deon Dove, and was 
acting within the scope and authority of that agency. In 
particular, defendant Van was in charge of security at the 
Roosevelt store of defendant Dove. 
3. When plaintiff had completed the purpose that he had 
came to the store of defendant Deon Dove for, he was about to 
exit the same, when he was requested by the defendant Van to 
accompany Van and a third party to a room at the rear of the 
store so that they could talk to the plaintiff. 
4. Plaintiff voluntarily complied with the request made by 
defendant Van, by accompanying Van to the room to the rear of the 
store. 
5. In the back room plaintiff inquired as to why the 
defendant Van wanted to talk to him. Van indicated that they 
were waiting for the Roosevelt City Police to come. 
6. When the Roosevelt City Police officers arrived at the 
store, the defendant Van directed the Police officers to search 
plaintiff and another individual. The defendant Van specifically 
indicated that he thought that plaintiff had removed a TV 
"splitter" from its carton, and he was sure that one of the two 
bovs had it on them. 
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62 7. The search of the plaintiff by the Roosevelt City 
63 Police officers failed to produce any property on the person of 
64 either the plaintiff or the other individual, that belonged to 
65 the store of the defendant Deon Dove. 
66 8. When the Police Officers inquired as to what the 
67 defendant Van intended to do, the defendant Van then placed the 
68 plaintiff under arrest, and requested the Roosevelt Police 
69 Officers to transport plaintiff to the Roosevelt Police Station 
70 for booking, etc. The defendant Van signed the citation charging 
71 the plaintiff with shoplifting. 
72 9. After the plaintiff had been placed under arrest and 
73 transported by the Roosevelt City Police officers to the Police 
74 Station, an agent of the defendant Dove found on one of the 
75 shelves in the store, the item that the defendant Van alleged 
76 that the plaintiff had stolen. 
77 10. The plaintiff was handcuffed and escorted from the 
73 store of the defendant Dove through a public exit, and in the 
79 view of his friends and other shoppers. 
80 11. The Roosevelt City Police officers transported the 
81 plaintiff to the Police Station, where the plaintiff was booked, 
82 i.e., finger-printed, mug shot taken, and a permanent criminal 
83 record was made. Plaintiff was subsequently released after 
84 posting a bond in the sum of *106.00. 
85 12. A formal criminal action was commenced against the 
86 plaintiff in the Seventh Circuit Court of the State of Utah, 
87 Roosevelt Department. Said criminal action was dismissed before 
Page 3 
TUCKER v . DOVES 
88 the trial. Counsel -for Roosevelt City and Mr. Tucker, stipulated 
89 as to the -Facts and each submitted a memorandum of Law. The 
90 Court held that as a matter o-f law, the plaintiff had not 
91 committed a crime. 
92 12. Plaintiff hired counsel to represent him in the 
93 criminal charges, and the fees for said representation was 
94 5750.00. 
95 13. Plaintiff suffered humiliation at being arrested, hand-
96 cuffed and escorted from the store of the Defendant Dove by 
97 Roosevelt City Police Officers. 
98 14. Plaintiff's public record will show the filing of the 
99 criminal charges against him. The Court takes judicial notice 
100 that said record may be expunged within the time provided by law. 
101 Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
102 makes and enters the following 
103 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
104 1 . Inasmuch as the defendant Van was an agent of the 
105 defendant Dove, and was acting within the scope and authority of 
106 the agency that existed between the defendant Van and the 
107 defendant Dove, then as a matter of law, the defendant Dove is 
108 responsible for the actions complained of herein. 
109 2. The plaintiff was a business invitee of the defendant 
110 Dove at the times complained of by the plaintiff. 
111 3. The acts complained of occurred in Roosevelt, Duchesne 
112 County, Utah, and this court has jurisdiction over the persons 
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113 and subject matter of this dispute. Venue properly lies in this 
114 Court. 
115 4. The defendant Van may have had cause to stop the 
116 plaintiff and request that the plaintiff submit to a search to 
117 determine if the plaintiff had taken or secreted any property 
118 belonging to the defendant Dove. 
119 5. When the defendant Van found no property of the 
120 defendant Dove on the plaintiff's person or where it could have 
121 been placed by plaintiff, and having not located the item until 
122 after the citation had been signed and the arrest had been made, 
123 defendants were without probable cause to take any action beyond 
124 the initial detention and search and detention and search. 
125 6. The actions of the defendants were not done 
126 maliciously, even though no probable cause existed for arresting 
127 plaintiff . 
128 7. The plaintiff is entitled to general damages for the 
129 money he expended for posting bond and attorney fees. 
130 8. The plaintiff is entitled to compensatory damages for 
131 his public humiliation. The Court concludes that the sum of 
132 $2,500.00 is sufficient to compensate the plaintiff for the same. 
133 9. Having found no malicious conduct on the part of the 
134 defendants, the Court concludes that the plaintiff is not 
135 entitled to punitive damages. 
136 10. Plaintiff ought to be awarded his costs, expenses and 
137 interest as allowed by law. 
138 Dated this /Si day of Atcvomaert, 19Q#. 
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BY ORDER OF THE COURT 
142 Dennis L. Draney, 
143 District Judge 
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APPENDIX "D" 
Judgment 
SE0R6E E. MANGAN (2068), o-f 
GEORGE E. MANGAN, APC 
Attorney -for Plainti-f-f 
47 North Second East 
Roosevelt, Utah 84066 
801-722-2428 V- I 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF DUCHESNE .CBfcftlTX'^  
STATE OF UTAH H.O'ocr 
JEFF Q. TUCKER, 
Plainti-f-F , 
vs. 
DEON N. DOVE, dba DOVE'S^ 
HAPPY SERVICE, a corporation 
BENITO M. VAN and JOHN DOES 
1-10, 
De-fendants. 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 86-CV-94 D 
Judge Dennis L. Draney 
(teyftf Jxx^Ci 
The above entitled matter came on regularly for trial on 
September 15, 1987, be-fore the Honorable Dennis L. Draney. The 
plaintiff was present with his attorney, George E. Mangan. The 
defendants were also present with their attorney Fred D. Howard. 
Witnesses were called, sworn and did testify. Numerous exhibits 
were marked, identified and received into evidence. Both parties 
rested, and each argued their case to the Court and responded to 
inquiries of the Court. The Court took the matter under 
advisement. 
The Court having separately made and entered its Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, does ORDER, ADJUDGE AND DECREE as 
fol1ows : 
1. The plaintiff shall have and recover judgment against 
the defendants, jointly and separately. 
2. The plaintiff is awarded judgment for the $750,00 he 
incurred in attorney fees to defend in the criminal action. 
3. The plaintiff is awarded judgment for the $106.00 bond 
posted by the plaintiff if the same was not returned to the 
plaintiff or his mother. 
4. The plaintiff is awarded judgment in the sum of 
$2,500.00 far the humiliation he suffered by reason of his false 
arrest by the defendants. 
5. Plaintiff shall forthwith file a Memorandum of Costs 
and expenses as required in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
6. Plaintiff is entitled to pre-judgment interest on all 
moneys found to be due and owing to the plaintiff, as provided in 
- UCA, as amended. 
7. The sums awarded to plaintiff shall accrue interest at 
the highest legal rate allowed for judgments, which currently is 
12^ i per annum. 
Dated this /^T day of IMovcmbog>
 f 19B#. 
BY ORDER OF THE COURT 
Dennis L. Draney, 
District Judge 
? 
0 !/?-. 
-L - J 
